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Abstract
This paper analyzes the multilateral Brazilian foreign policy, mak-
ing the country a regional pivot in Latin America, a leading nation among 
developing countries, and an emerging world power. Without the status of 
nuclear power, Brazil establishes asymmetrical alliances to earn a place in 
a reformed UN Security Council, but must contend the seat with accred-
ited competitors, such as India, as well a strategic partner, and counteract 
some riotous neighbors, as Mexico and Argentina. Meanwhile, through 
the establishment and the membership in several international organiza-
tions and multilateral mechanisms, Brasília developes a worldwide policy, 
maneuvering between new and old alliances, and playing a ‘winning and 
losing carambole game’. Will the chrysalis turn into a butterfly?
Keywords: Brazil. UNASUR. BRICS. IBSA. BASIC. MERCOSUR.
Resumo
Este trabalho analisa a política externa multilateral do Brasil, fa-
zendo o país um pivô regional na América Latina, uma nação que assume 
a liderança entre os países em desenvolvimento e uma potência mundial 
emergente. Sem o status de potência nuclear, o Brasil estabelece alianças 
estratégicas para ganhar um lugar num Conselho de Segurança das Na-
ções Unidas reformado, mas tem que competir por este lugar com con-
correntes de peso, tal como a Índia, assim como um parceiro estratégico, 
e para contrapor-se a alguns vizinhos complexos, tal como o México e 
a Argentina. Enquanto isso, através do estabelecimento e da afiliação a 
muitas organizações internacionais e mecanismos multilaterais, Brasília 
desenvolve uma política mundial, manobrando entre alianças novas e an-
tigas, e jogando “carambola” com a possibilidade de conseguir o perder. A 
crisálida vai virar borboleta?









































With 200 million people, Brazil is the fi ft h most 
populous country in the world. Th e Brazilian economy 
is the largest in Latin America and the seventh largest in 
the world in terms of nominal GDP for purchasing power 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). With a gross do-
mestic product of 2.253 USD billion in 2012, Brazil oc-
cupies the 7th place in the world rankings (International 
Monetary Fund, 2013). Brazil is one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world economy and economic reforms 
have given a new international recognition to the coun-
try, both regionally and globally. 
Following the economic growth, the South Amer-
ican country seeks to expand its geopolitical infl uence. 
Brazil has woven a spider web which, starting from South 
America, covering all of Latin America and the Western 
Hemisphere, to the Eastern Hemisphere, with interests 
also in the Southern Hemisphere.
Brazilian foreign policy has generally been based 
on the principles of multilateralism. Brazil is a founding 
member of the United Nations (UN), the Communi-
ty of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the Latin 
Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), the 
Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI), the South-
ern Cone Common Market (Spanish: Mercosul; Portu-
guese: Mercosur), the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR), BRICS, BASIC, and the IBSA Trilateral Di-
alogue Forum; moreover is one of the member countries 
of the G-20 and of the G-4.
Conscious of its emerging economic power, Brazil 
wants to carve out a leading role also in world politics. 
Policy initiatives taken by the government of Brasí lia in 
the last twenty years, aim to make the South American 
giant the leader for political and economic integration, 
and for social development of the continent, as well as to 
set up a regional defense and security mechanism, pro-
moting military co-operation, with the ambition to sup-
port major emerging economies such as China and India. 
However, being an emerging country does not mean be-
ing an emerging power: Brazil can actually be considered 
a rising ‘middle power’.
Th e strategy of Brazil, to establish itself as the 
dominant regional power, includes integration initiatives 
and monetary policy, the social and economic develop-
ment, action to make funding available for development, 
in particular aimed at social inclusion and building a 
network of infrastructure that links between them, more 
effi  ciently, the South American countries, even in terms 
of increasing trade in goods and the mobility of citizens 
without visa requirements. Th ere’s also a project of com-
mon defense and security policy among the South Amer-
ican countries, although it encounters more diffi  culties.
 2 The First Step of a Rising Power: the Backyard 
Strategy
Th e strategy of Brazil has been paid, at fi rst, to 
consolidate its position in the South American continent. 
In 1991, Brazil was one of the founders of Mercosur2, the 
common market of South America, established on the basis 
of the experience of the European Union’s internal market 
or ‘Common Market’. Th e goal of Mercosur is to achieve a 
common market with the abolition of customs duties.
Mercosur has gone, gradually expanded, and to-
day, in addition to the founding countries (as well as Bra-
zil, Argentina, Paraguay - currently suspended - Uruguay 
and Venezuela), sees the association of Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the interest of Mexico and 
New Zealand as observers.
Th e focus of Brazil to other South American coun-
tries, with which it wants to implement a program of po-
litical collaboration, cultural and economic life, is also un-
derlined by the Union of South American Nations (Unión 
de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR), the cooperation 
program established in May 2008, at the Th ird Summit of 
Heads of State, held in Brasí lia (UNASUR, 2014). UNA-
SUR is an intergovernmental union integrating two exist-
ing customs unions - Mercosur and the Andean Commu-
nity of Nations - as part of a continuing process of South 
American integration, which entered into force on March 
2011, aft er Uruguay became the ninth state to ratify the 
Treaty, thus giving the union full legality. As a fonder 
member of UNASUR, Brasil was a associate member of 
Mercosur and of the Andean Community.
Formerly designated as the South American Com-
munity of Nations, the mechanics of the new entity, estab-
lished by seven founding countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay), came 
2 MERCOSUR. Selected Rules. Foundational Instruments of 
Mercosur [pdf]. Mercosur: Montevideo. Available at: <http://
www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/2486/1/0_libro_mer-
cosur_-_port.pdf>. Accessed: 23 feb. 2015.
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out of the First South American Community of Nations 
Heads of State Summit, which was held in Brasí lia in Sep-
tember 2005. Th e aim of the Strategic Plain 2012-20223 is 
to eliminate tariff s for non-sensitive products by 2014 and 
sensitive products by 2019. Brazil is heavily involved in the 
implementation of the South American Integration Plan set 
by the COSIPLAN Agenda of Priority Projects4.
At present UNASUR include twelve member 
states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, Ecua-
dor, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, Uruguay and Ve-
nezuela), including two from the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), as Guyana and Suriname, and two observ-
ers (Mexico and Panama).
UNASUR came up after the negotiations on the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) multilateral 
agreement - an extension of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States - reached a dead point in 20055: 
developed nations ask to increase trade in services 
and to extend patents and intellectual property rights, 
while less developed countries call for an end to agri-
coltural subiside and free trade in agricultural goods, 
to open new markets to their products or to increase 
their export (FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERI-
CAS, 2006)6.
As Samuel P. Huntington wrote in his 1993 article 
in Foreign A airs magazine, which later expanded in  e 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(1996): “Th e West in eff ect is using international institu-
tions, military power and economic resources to run the 
world in ways that will maintain Western pre-dominance, 
3 SOUTH AMERICAN COUNCIL OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND PLANNING (COSIPLAN). Strategic Action Plan for 
Ten Years (2012-2022) [pdf]. Brasí lia, DF: Ministry of Plan-
ning, Budget and Management. Available at: <http://www.
planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/noticias/
spi/111130_Cosiplan_PAE_Plano_de_%20acao_estrategico.
pdf>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.
4 MINISTRY OF PLANNING, BUDGET AND MANAGE-
MENT. Program 2043 South American Integration [pdf]. 
Brasí lia, DF: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. 
Available at: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/
upload/Arquivos/lai/120418_lai_prog_tematicos_2043.
pdf>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.
5 Th e last summit was held at Mar del Plata, Argentina, in No-
vember 2005, but no agreement on FTAA was reached, and 
no meeting has took place later to resume negotiations.
6 See also FTAA Trade Ministerial Meetings, Ministerial De-
clarations [online]. Available at: <http://www.ft aa-alca.org/
Minis_e.asp>. Accessed: 25 feb. 2015.
protect Western interests and promote Western political 
and economic values” (HUNTINGTON, 1993, 1996).
FTAA, which aim is facilitating business measures 
and commercial exchange in the Western Hemisphere, 
opened its negotiations ensuring that will be “fully con-
sistent with the provisions of the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization” (MINISTERS RESPON-
SIBLE FOR TRADE REPRESENTING THE 34 NA-
TIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE SUMMIT 
OF THE AMERICAS, 1995), and always reaffi  rmed that 
“will be consistent with the rules and disciplines of the 
World Trade Organization” (MINISTERS RESPONSI-
BLE FOR TRADE IN THE HEMISPHERE, 2003) 7 and 
that “will be compatible with and will build on the WTO” 
(MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRADE IN THE 
HEMISPHERE, 2002).
Brazil is at the forefront in the struggle of developing 
countries to obtain medicines at lower price; the action of the 
Brazilian government is not limited within the WTO, but it 
provides a global alliance with such nations: in November 
2007, the Brazilian Minister of Health and the Ministries of 
other four member countries of Mercosur (Argentina, Uru-
guay, Paraguay and Venezuela) signed an agreement for the 
implementation of the Bank of Drug Prices (Banco de Preços 
de Medicamentos). Th e bank will contain the amounts paid 
by each of them in the purchase of medicine, following the 
Brazilian model (MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 2005), where 
health managers have available such information nation-
wide. To facilitate negotiations for lower prices at the lab-
oratories, the system will contribute to increasing access to 
medicines and supplies in the region (SAMRSLA, 2009). 
Th e guidelines are included in the Rio Document (HEALTH 
MINISTERS OF MERCOSUR (HEALTH MINISTERS 
OF MERCOSUR, 2007), which provides guidance on 
patent regimes and access to drugs for Mercosur. In Janu-
ary 2010 at the headquarters of Pan American Health Or-
ganization (PAHO)/World Health Organization (WHO), 
member of the UN system, in Brazil held the fi rst meeting 
that began work to program the Banco de Preços de Medica-
mentos (BPM) for American countries (PAN AMERICAN 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010).
Similar to the WTO talks Brazil has taken a lead-
ership role among the less developed nations, while the 









































United States has taken a similar role for the developed 
nations. Brazil proposed a series of bilateral agreements 
(FTAA has 34 standing members) to reduce specifi c tar-
iff s on goods, and Washington established a series of bi-
lateral trade deals.
To expand trade in the Western Hemisphere, 
the U.S. moved in the direction of establishing a series 
of bilateral trade agreements with countries which are 
members of Mercosur (trade deal with Mercosur found-
ing members, including Brazil, has already been signed 
in 1991), or of the Andean Comunity (1969). While is 
proposing itself as a leading country in the region, Brazil 
must take into account existing agreements between the 
United States and South American countries members of 
UNASUR, as well as its relationship with Washington: a 
policy that requires skills of diplomatic balancing act.
At the UNASUR Th ird South American Sum-
mit on 8 December 2004, presidents or representatives 
from 12 South American nations signed the Cusco Dec-
laration8, a two-page statement of intent announcing the 
foundation of the South American Community (Comu-
nidad Suramericana de Naciones, later renamed Unión 
de Naciones Suramericanas). Th e group announced their 
intention to model the new community aft er the Europe-
an Union including a common currency, parliament, and 
passport, approving the concept of South American citi-
zenship, and abolishing visa requirements for tourists be-
tween member nations. Presidents of the seven founding 
countries offi  cially launched the South American Bank 
in Buenos Aires in December 2007, to “develope e new 
fi nancial regional architecture”9.
On 9 December 2007 Brazil was one of the found-
ing states, with Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
8 PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERI-
CA. Cusco Declaration on the South American Community of 
Nations [online]. Th ird South American Presidential Sum-
mit, Cusco, 8 December 2004. Lima: Andean Community, 
2010. Available at: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/doc-
umentos/dec_int/cusco_sudamerica.htm>. Accessed: 25 feb. 
2015.
9 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF 
THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS (UNA-
SUR). Statement by the Council of Ministers of Foreign A airs 
of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) [pdf], 
Asunción, 17 March 2012, Paragraph 13. Bogotà, DC: Mi-
nistry of Foreign Aff airs. Available at: <https://www.can-
cilleria.gov.co/sites/default/fi les/news/fi eld_attached_news/
Declaración%20de%20Asunción.pdf>. Accessed: 1 mar. 
2015.
Uruguay e Venezuela, of the Bank of the South (Spanish: 
Banco del Sur, Portuguese: Banco do Sul), a development 
bank to fund infrastructure projects and support the public 
and private enterprises of the signatory countries (SCAN-
DIUCCI, 2007, p. 19) 10, and participates in its capital with 
4,000 million dollars. One of the fi rst projects to be exam-
ined by the new institution is the construction of a 12,500 
km pipeline linking Venezuela to Argentina via Brazil.
UNASUR started plans of integration through 
infrastructure cooperation with the construction of the 
Interoceanic Highway, a road that intends to more fi rm-
ly link the Pacifi c Coast countries, especially Chile and 
Peru with Brazil and Argentina by extending highways 
through the continent, allowing better connections to 
ports from Bolivia and the inner parts of Argentina, Peru, 
and Brazil. Th e fi rst corridor, between Peru and Brazil, 
began construction in September 2005, fi nanced 60 per-
cent by Brazil and 40 percent by Peru, and was completed 
in December 2010. Th is Initiative for Infrastructure Inte-
gration of South America (IIRSA) has received the sup-
port of the Inter-American Development Bank and of the 
Development Bank of Latin America.
Th e ultimate goal of the Bank of the South is to in-
clude every state within the region of South America. Th e 
bank serves as an alternative to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, remaining through 
the unpopularity of these institutions in Latin America, 
and has been established because of disapproval of the 
enforcement of unrelated free market reforms on coun-
tries seeking emergency loans (KLEIN, 2008). It also 
represents an attempt to achieve regional independence 
and endogenous development. Th e program would lend 
money to any nation involved in the construction of ap-
proved programs, and without conditions traditionally 
attached to such loans, such as deregulation.
Th is regional initiative fi elded by Brazil, aims to 
create an alternative to the IMF and Word Bank, but not 
the only one: whitin the BRICS formed similar fi nancial 
10 See also VAZ, 2008, p. 31. and MINISTRY OF PLANNING, 
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT. DEPARTMENT OF 
PLANNING AND STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS. Assessment 
Report of the Multi-Year Plan 2004-2007: Year 2008-Base Year 
2007. Ministry of Foreign A airs. Book 14 [pdf]. Brasí lia, DF: 
Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management. Department 
of Planning and Strategic Investments, 2008, p. 10. Available at: 
<http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arqui-
vos/spi/plano_plurianual/avaliacao_PPA/relatorio_2008/08_
PPA_Aval_cad14_MRE.pdf>. Accessed: 23 feb. 2015.
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institution, the New Development Bank. 
On the side of the defense Brazil and Venezuela 
proposed the South American Defense Council (CDS) 
to serve as a mechanism for regional security, promoting 
military co-operation and regional defense (UNASUR, 
2015). From the beginning Brazil, Argentina and Chile, 
the countries that took the leadership of the project, made 
clear that they did not intend to form a NATO-like alli-
ance, but a cooperative security arrangement, enhancing 
multilateral military cooperation, promoting confi dence 
and security building measures and fostering defense in-
dustry exchange.
Brazil is playing a leading role in building a strong 
political union among the South American countries, 
also favored by the fact that it has no territorial dispute 
with neighboring countries.
 3 The Second Step: the Global Strategy
Achieved the regional leadership, Brazil poits to 
an alliance with the emerging economies, in particular, 
with the Republic of South Africa and India, as part of the 
BRICS. BRICS is an acronym used in international eco-
nomics referring collectively to Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa, whome are distinguished by their large, 
fast-growing economies and signifi cant infl uence on re-
gional and global aff airs; all fi ve are G-20 members. Th e 
BRICS represent a kind of club of ‘potential superpowers’.
At the Copenhagen climate summit held on 28 
November 2009, four of this nations - Brazil, South Af-
rica, India and China, excluding Russia - established the 
BASIC countries, a bloc of newly industrialized countries, 
leding and representing the major developing counties, 
opposing, within the WTO, the developed nations led by 
the European Union, the United States, and Japan, even if 
Tokyo joined Brazil in the G-4. Th e contention on patents 
on medicines, inside FTAA and WTO, makes Brazil an 
ally of the African countries, in need of expensive treat-
ment for HIV/AIDS, a pandemic that plagues the conti-
nent, with 23,5 million people leaving with HIV in 2011 
(latest data available) (JOINT UNITED NATIONS PRO-
GRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2012). South Af-
rica, a strong strategic ally of Brazil, has 5,600,000 cases.
As of 2014, the fi ve BRICS countries represent 
almost 3 billion people, or approximately 40 percent of 
the world population. Th e fi ve nations have a combined 
nominal GDP of 16.039 USD trillion, equivalent to ap-
proximately 20 percent of the gross world product, and 
an estimated 4 USD trillion in combined foreign reserves 
(INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 2011). By 
December 2014, the BRICS countries hold 1,669.1 USB 
billion of U.S. public debt11, thus representing the main 
lenders to Washington.
In November 2010, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has included the BRICS countries among the 
ten countries with the highest voting. Since the non-allo-
cation of quotas, lying at the U.S. Congress, a redistribu-
tion which had been made by the countries of the BRICS, 
they have created their own independent fi nancial struc-
turing (New Development Bank) (MRE, 2014), an alter-
native to the IMF during their 6th summit in Fortaleza, 
Brazil, on 15 July 2014. Th e group of emerging countries 
agreded to create the 100 USD billion Development Bank 
(its initial stated capital is 50 USD billion), with primary 
focus of lending for infrastructure projects, and a reserve 
currency (Contingent Reserve Arrangement) worth over 
another 100 USD billion, to provide protection against 
global liquidity pressures (BRICS, 2014). Brazil contrib-
utes for 10 USD billion for the developement capital, and 
would give 18 USD billion for the Currency Reserve Pool 
(PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE’S INFOR-
MATION OFFICE, 2013). Both funds will counter the 
infl uence of Western-dominated IMF and World Bank 
lending institutions and the dollar. Th is is the second 
initiative fi elded by the Brazilian government, to support 
developing countries, aft er the bank established within 
UNASUR. As wrote Huntington:
“Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council 
or in the International Monetary Fund […] re-
fl ect the interests of the West” and “the interests 
of the United States and other Western powers. 
Th rough the IMF and other international eco-
nomic institutions, the West promotes its eco-
nomic interests and imposes on other nations 
the economic policies it thinks appropriate” 
(HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 39).
Th e partnership among the BRICS countries, which 
has held annual summits since 2009, is becoming some-
thing more than just a commercial and cultural alliance; it’s 
turning itself into a global political antagonist of the West-
11 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRESAURY. Major Foreign 
Holders of Treasury Sescurities [online]. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of the Tresaury. Available at: <http://www.









































ern-dominate institutions. In March 2014, at a meeting on 
the margins of the Nuclear Security Summit in Th e Hague, 
the BRICS Foreign Ministers expressed concern about the 
“recent media statement on the forthcoming G-20 Summit 
to be held in Brisbane in November” (NKOANA-MASH-
ABANE, 2014), in response to the statement of Australian 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who had said earlier that 
Russian president Vladimir Putin might be barred from 
attending the G-20 Summit in Brisbane in light of the ten-
sions surrounding the Crimean crisis.
 On 15 April 2015 Brazil became one of the 57 
founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB) promoter by China (ASIAN INFRA-
STRUCTURE INVESTMENT, 2015). Th e AIIB is ex-
pected to be founded by the end of 2015 with a capital of 
100 USD billion. It aims to support infrastructure projects 
in Asia, as well as the Bank of the South and the New De-
velopment Bank. As a regional development bank, AIIB’s 
regional members, like Brazil, will be the majority share-
holders; non-regional members will hold smaller equity 
shares. All strategic partners of Brasí lia, excluding Japan, 
have joined the initiative opposed by Washington as a po-
tential competitor of Western-dominated IMF and World 
Bank. Apart from Portugal, Brazil is also the only mem-
ber of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries 
which joined the new Asian bank. Brazil is the only South 
American nation among the founding members of AIIB, 
thus confi rming its vocation of ‘bridge builder’ between 
South America and Asia.
 Brazil should try to bring in active its trade bal-
ance by exporting products and services to markets with 
stronger economies, such as China and India, if wants to 
be able to have resources to invest in its internal develop-
ment.
 4 Smart Power, Between Old Alliances and 
New Alliances
Despite the new global alliance between countries 
that oppose Western institutions, the U.S., as well as Eu-
rope, do not give up on relations with the South Ameri-
can giant, as “is clearly in the interest of the West […] to 
incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the 
West” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 49). 
On the other hand, Brazil does not seem to want to 
give up the relationship with the Western countries, too, 
“to attempt to ‘balance’ the West by developing economic 
and military power and cooperating with other non-West-
ern societies against the West, while preserving indigenous 
values and institutions” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 41). 
Th e diplomatic choice of Brasí lia is mainly due to the neg-
ative situation of the balance of payments, which requires 
the South American country to keep open as many chan-
nels as possible for the export of goods and services.
Brazil registered a 3.93 USD billion trade defi cit 
in 2014, the biggest since 1998 as exports declined more 
than imports, according to the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC, 2015). Brazilian 
trade balance averaged 639.66 USD million from 1959 
until 2015, reaching an all time high of 5659.37 USD mil-
lion in July of 2006 and a record low of -4058.14 USD 
million in January of 2014.
From 2001 to 2012, Brazil ran regular trade sur-
pluses, primarily due to high export of mining and agri-
cultural products12. In 2013, the country started record-
ing trade defi cits and in 2014 registered fi rst annual trade 
defi cit since 2000 as a decline in the value of commodities 
exports was higher than a drop in imports of consump-
tion products. In 2014, the biggest trade defi cits were re-
corded with the United States, and the biggest trade sur-
pluses with China, which is the largest trading partner 
of Brazil and, in turn, Brazil is the ninth largest trading 
partner of China (MDIC, 2014).
Th e Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership has been 
established in 1993, and has been developed as well as 
international and regional issues of common interest, 
and in 2009 a Joint Action Plan (2010-2014) covering the 
whole spectrum of bilateral cooperation has been signed 
(JINTAO; LULA DA SILVA, 2009).
China has signed 32 cooperation agreements with 
Brazil, among them the one in the energy fi eld, and the 
one for the production of 35 Embraer aircraft s (UNA-
SUR, 2001), one of the largest aircraft  manufacturers in 
the world, and one of the few Brazilian companies suc-
cessful in international markets. Th e strong growth of 
the Chinese economy has forced the Asian country to 
depend on imports of agricultural supplies, mainly from 
12 MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRY AND 
FOREIGN TRADE. Other Foreign Trade Statistics [online]. 
Brasília, DF: Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade. Available at: <http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/
interna.php?area=5&menu=608>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.
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Brazil, which exports soya, fl our, corn, cotton and meat. 
Th e Brazilian-Chinese bilateral exchange has increased 
20 times in the last decade, moving from a trade of 2,300 
USD million dollars in 2000 to 56,400 USD million in 
2010. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, largest ex-
port market and largest source of import.
Th e two countries maintain good relations and a 
coordination mechanism in international organizations 
and multilateral bodies, including the United Nations, 
the World Trade Organization, the G-20, BRICS, and the 
BASIC countries.13
Although the Asian market represents for Brazil 
45 billion trade surplus14, which concern raw materials 
together with some fi nished products, the South Ameri-
can giant does not give up the relationship with industri-
alized countries (the largest trading partner of Brazil, the 
European Union). In 2008, representatives of Mercosur 
and the European Union (EU) participated in meetings 
to assess the current state of negotiations between the two 
blocs, suspended in the previous two years. Th e eff ective 
recovery thereof shall be given aft er completion of the 
current round of WTO negotiations (Doha Round) and 
the consequent defi nition of the detailed rules for agri-
cultural activities at the multilateral level (VAZ, 2008, p. 
31). Th e developing countries, lead and rappresented by 
Brazil, as well as by China, India and South Africa, ask 
to break down trade barriers and agricultural subsidies 
(WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2015).
Th e position of Brazil with respect to the WTO, 
makes it a natural ally of all the developing countries of 
the global South, and of most of the nations of the Eastern 
Hemisphere. In this position, however, there are also oth-
er countries that aspire to the recognition of a geopolitical 
worldwide role, fi rst of all India, and this does not bring 
any competitive benefi t to Brazil.
Despite the controversy with the IMF and World 
13 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. China and Brazil [onli-
ne]. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, the People's Repub-
lic of China, 2008-2014. Available at: <http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ldmzs_664952/
gjlb_664956/3473_665008/>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.
14 MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRY AND 
FOREIGN TRADE. Foreign Trade. Foreign Trade Statisti-
cs-DEAEX. Brazilian Trade Balance: Countries and Blocks. 
Countries and Economic Blocks [online]. Brasília, DF: Min-
istry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Avai-
lable at: <http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.
php?area=5&menu=4892&refr=576>. Accessed: 28 feb. 
2015.
Bank and the alliance with Russia, China, India and 
South Africa, there is a good relationship with the Unit-
ed States, which does not have good relations with some 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Venezuela, Bo-
livia, Ecuador and Nicaragua in the head): Brazil plays 
an important role in mediating between the two blocks, 
although with caution as they do not want to stand out 
against other countries.
Th e United States engages with Brazil on trade and 
investment matters through a number of initiatives. On 
19 March 2011, President Obama and President Rousseff  
signed the Agreement on Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion (THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, 2011) “to en-
hance cooperation on trade and investment between 
the Western Hemisphere’s two largest economies”15. Th e 
agreement expands the American “direct trade and in-
vestment relationship by providing a framework to deep-
en cooperation on a number of issues of mutual concern, 
including innovation, trade facilitation and technical 
barriers to trade”, and “represents a shared commitment 
to broad-based economic growth, and is a foundation for 
cooperation in other trade fora”16. U.S. foreign direct in-
vestment in Brazil (stock) was 79.4 USD billion in 2012 
(latest data available), up 7.5 percent from 201117.
Washington is very concerned with the relations 
with the South American giant, which allows the U.S. 
trade balance to come to 107 USD billion of goods and 
private services trade with Brazil, totaling 29 USD billion 
surplus in 2012 (latest data available)18. Brazil was the 
United States’ 7h  largest goods export market in 2013 - 
U.S. exports to Brazil accounted for 2.8 percent of overall 
U.S. exports in 2013, excluding military sales, direct de-
fense expenditures, and other miscellaneous government 
services - and is currently U.S. 9th  largest goods trading 
15 THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
(USTR). Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil [onli-
ne]. Washington, D.C.: Th e Offi  ce of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR). Executive Offi  ce of the President of the 
United States. Available at: <https://ustr.gov/countries-re-
gions/americas/brazil>. Accessed: 24 feb. 2015.
16 THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
(USTR), Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil.
17 THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
(USTR), Home/Countries & Regions/Americas/Brazil.
18 THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 








































partner with 72 USD billion in total (two ways) goods 
trade during 2013 (the American surplus with Brazil was 
17 USD billion in 2013). Trade in private services with 
Brazil (exports and imports) totaled 31 USD billion in 
2012 (latest data available). Th e U.S. services trade sur-
plus with Brazil was 17 USD billion in 2012. Brazil is also 
a major creditor and the sixth largest foreign holder of 
U.S. public debt, with 255.8 USD billion (latest data avail-
able at December 2014)19.
 5 A Giant with Desire for Greatness
The position of Brazil reflects the multipolarity 
that distinguishes the world after the end of the Cold 
War. Many emerging countries have assumed the role 
of emerging powers, not only at the regional level, and 
Russia has risen from the ashes of the decadent era of 
Yeltsin.
As Huntington argued in 1993, world politics en-
tered a new phase aft er the fall of communism and the 
end of the Cold War (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 22), and 
“had been moved into a new aspect in which non-West-
ern civilizations were no more the exploited recipients of 
Western civilization but become another important actor 
joining the West to shape and move the world history” 
(MURDEN, 2011, p. 416-426). It’s “Th e West versus the 
rest” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 39-41).
Even if the armed forces of Brazil are the sec-
ond largest in Latin America by active personnel, with 
only approximately 190,000 soldiers on a population of 
200,000,000, and the largest by the level of military equip-
ment - at the 28th place in the world ranking of largest 
armies20, and at 15th place of active duty uniformed troop 
strenght21 - the lack of traditional hard power (military 
power and global security infl uence) is an obstacle to the 
ambitions of the country (HO CHUN, 2014). In confi r-
mation of this ambition, there is the aircraft  carrier São 
19 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRESAURY, Major Foreign 
Holders of Treasury Sescurities.
20 GLOBALSECURITY.ORG. World’s Largest Armies 
[online]. Alexandria, VA: GlobalSecurity.org. Available 
at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.
htm>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.
21 GLOBALSECURITY.ORG. Active Duty Uniformed 
Troop Strength [online]. Alexandria, VA: GlobalSecurity.org. 
Available at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
active-force.htm>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.
Paulo22, which places the South American country among 
the 12 nations in the world to have this vessel (among the 
others: Japan, and India, with two units, and Russia and 
China, with one carrier each) (GLOBALFIREPOWER.
COM, 2015). In addition to this, Brazil has plans to ac-
quire two more aircraft  carriers of 50,000 tons by 2028.23
Brazil is the 12th state with the highest military 
expenditure in 2013 (33.5 USD billion on a total world 
military expenditure of 1747 USD billion, equivalent to 
2.4 per cent of global GDP), aft er Italy and before Aus-
tralia, making 1,8 per cent of the world budget (China is 
ranked in second position, aft er USA, with 11 per cent, 
Russia occupies third place with 5 per cent, Germany 
and Japan are both ranked equally at number seven and 
eight with 2,8 per cent, followed by India with 2,7 per cent 
(PERLO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRANO, 2014, p. 2). Th e ex-
perience of the military dictatorship (1964-1985) led to 
the will of the successive democratic governments, not 
to over-investment in the fi eld of defense, so that Brazil 
is now having to recover this gap, becoming the largest 
spender in the region.
Brazil, as well as all other countries of the Western 
Hemisphere, is not a North Atlantic Alliance member. 
Non-Western countries are kept away from implement-
ing their military capacity, as weapons, as well as the mil-
itary option remains the last resort. Nuclear power is a 
political weapon, and Brazil, which claims a leading role 
not only regionally, but also globally, it is free, and this 
diminishes the political role. Brazil is balancing this lack 
of power in the BRICS initiative (FLEMES, 2010) even 
if India is an antagonist for the ride to the UN Security 
Council.
Th e availability of nuclear weapons increases the 
power and the political prestige of the country that holds, 
although these slating only value as a deterrent. Th us, “In 
the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms 
control is to prevent the development by non-Western so-
cieties of military capabilities that could threaten Western 
22 BRAZILIAN NAVY. Features of the Aircra  Carrier Sao 
Paulo [online]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: 
<https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/default/fi les/ima-
gens/poder_naval/unidades_navais/meios_esquadra/
cards/1A12_saopaulo.html>. Accessed: 5 mar. 2015.
23 BRAZILIAN NAVY. Aircra  Carrier Obtaining Program 
(PRONAE) [online]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available 
at: <http://www.mar.mil.br/acessoainformacao/html/acoes_
programas/pronae.html>. Accessed: 5 mar. 2015.
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interests” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 46). Development 
of a nuclear arsenal, as well as increase of convention-
al military strenght weapons, it’s a must for all nations 
which aspire to the role of a real power.
Th e Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil) develops 
since 1979 a national interest nuclear program (Nuclear 
Parallel Program), in order to cause a reactor prototype 
for the nuclear-powered submarine (SN-BR) (BRAZIL-
IAN NAVY, 2008). Th e goal of the program is to ensure 
the country’s full fi eld of the nuclear fuel cycle through 
the use of domestic technologies. Brazil has since 1958 
the fi rst nuclear reactor in South America, since 1988 
Brazilian manufactured, and belongs to the select group 
of countries that have uranium enrichment technology, a 
strategic energy resource. 
While the cycle of nuclear fuel production is 
complete, and Brazil has the ability to plan and manu-
facture its nuclear fuel without any external dependen-
cy, and has also the knowledge to project and build nu-
clear power plants24, the program of the first Brazilian 
nuclear-powered submarine (COGESN) is ongoing in 
the Nuclear-Power Generation Laboratory (Labgene). 
The construction of the SN-BR started in 2012, and 
should be ready in 2023, when will undergo dock and 
sea tests and trials, and then transferred to the oper-
ating sector of the Navy in 202525 . In this project are 
provided 13,600 direct jobs and 46,000 indirect, thus 
contributing to the economic and social development 
of the country.
Th ese activities represent an important increase of 
power deterrent to the naval defense of the country, in 
addition to enlisting Brazil in the select group of hold-
ers of this strategic technology, whose knowledge is not 
shared (BILESKY, 2014).
According to the Brazilian Navy26 the construc-
tion of the SN-BR involves three important issues for the 
country: the strategic, the technological and the domestic 
industry. In naval warfare, submarines add an undeniable 
24 BRAZILIAN NAVY.  e Navy Nuclear Program [online]. 
Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: <https://www.
marinha.mil.br/programa-nuclear-da-marinha>. Accessed: 
15 mar. 2015.
25 BRAZILIAN NAVY. Submarine Development Program 
(PROSUB) [pdf]. Brasília, DF: Brazilian Navy. Available at: 
<https://www.mar.mil.br/acessoainformacao/pdf/snbr.pdf>. 
Accessed: 15 mar. 2015.
26 BRAZILIAN NAVY. Submarine Development Program 
(PROSUB), p. 2-3.
strategic importance, which causes a deterrent eff ect, and 
the submarine with nuclear propulsion can be consid-
ered the ‘Lord of the Seas’, a fact that - according to the 
Marinha do Brasil (MB) - proves important considering 
that over 90 percent of Brazilian oil is extracted from the 
sea. Similarly, over 95 percent of Brazilian foreign trade is 
transported by sea. In the strategic conception of the MB, 
the availability of submarines of this type means adding 
a new dimension to naval power of the country, ensuring 
enviable deterrent capability.
Brazil, which at present does not enjoy the nu-
clear deterrence, either directly or as a member of 
NATO, however, is an ally of BRICS nuclear powers: In-
dia (since 1974), Russia (since 1949), and China (since 
1964) (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2014), which hold the lead-
ership in the Eastern Hemisphere, where Washington 
has lost infl uence, with India that wants to regain its lost 
importance in the region. South Africa ended its nucle-
ar weapons programme in 1989, dismantled six bombs, 
and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons on 10 July 1991 (PURKITT; BURGESS, 2005). 
None of this nations is a member of the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA)27.
China and Russia, in particular, which are region-
al powers in Asia, are threatened by the advance of NATO 
to the East, which now came to the Ukraine. Moreover, 
China claims Taiwan, offi  cially still the Republic of Chi-
na, as its 23rd province, to be under its sovereignty. Th e 
government of Taipei enjoys the protection of the U.S., 
granted under the Taiwan Relations Act28. Despite this, 
U.S. president Barack Obama has stated that U.S.-China 
relationship to be “bilateral, regional and global coop-
eration to a new level” (XI; OBAMA, 2014). Th e United 
States has with China the most important bilateral trade 
relationship, with a trade volume increased from 5 USD 
27 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)/INTERNATIONAL EN-
ERGY AGENCY (IEA). Non-member countries [online]. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD)/International Energy Agency (IEA). Avai-
lable at: <http://www.iea.org/countries/non-membercoun-
tries/>. Accessed: 1 mar. 2015.
28 U.S.A. CONGRESS. Taiwan Relations Act [pdf], TRA; Pub.L. 
96–8, 93 Stat. 14, Enacted 10 April 1979; H.R. 2479. Washin-
gton, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Offi  ce (GPO). Avai-
lable at: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/








































billion in 1981 to 535 USD billion in 201229. China is also 
the major creditor and the largest foreign holder of U.S. 
public debt, with 1,244.3 USD billion (latest data available 
at December 2014)30.
As non-Western nations, this countries “assert 
their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons 
they think necessary for their security” (HUNTING-
TON, 1996, p. 46). “Centrally important to the devel-
opment of counter-West military capabilities is the 
sustained expansion of China’s military power and its 
means to create military powder”, which is “is rapidly 
increasing its military spending and vigorously moving 
forward with the modernization of its armed forces” and 
“is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technolo-
gy” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 47), as well as Russia (in 
Latin American countries is growing rapidly park Rus-
sian-made helicopters). Brasí lia can enjoy indirectly the 
prestige conferred by atomic weapons, thanks to the axis 
with BRICS nuclear powers.
Th e total militare expenditure of BRICS nations 
amounts to 359,259 USD million, compared to the U.S. 
defense budget, which amounts to 640,221 USD million 
(Brazil 31,456, Russia 87,837, India 47,398, China 188,460, 
South Africa 4,108) (STOCKHOLM INTERNATION-
AL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 2014). While 
the United States has the world’s largest army (1,369,000 
soldiers), the BRICS totalize 1,975,000 strength31, reach-
ing top position if we consider Chinese active duty uni-
formed troop strenght, with a total of 4,921,000 soldiers 
compared to U.S. 1,625,852 personnel32. During the 
2000s, military spending increased fairly rapidly in most 
of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, Russia and China), 
but since 2009–10 these increases have stopped or gone 
slightly into reverse, as economic growth has weakened 
and spending on other sectors has taken priority (PER-
LO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRANO, 2014, p. 3).
Without nuclear weapons, Brazil tries to establish 
itself as an emerging space power, working with other na-
29 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. Trade in Goods with China [pdf]. 
Suitland, Md.: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: <http://
www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>. Ac-
cessed: 28 feb. 2015.
30 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TRESAURY, Major Foreign 
Holders of Treasury Sescurities.
31 GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, World's Largest Armies.
32 GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Active Duty Uniformed Troop 
Strength.
tions, including China, India and Russia, which have diff er-
ent space programs(HARVEY; SMID; PIRAD, 2010). Th e 
Brazilian Space Agency (Agência Espacial Brasileira, AEB) 
has the most advanced space program in South America, 
and on 30 March 2006 put into space an astronaut, accord-
ing with Russian Space Agency: a 20 USD million ticket 
paid by Brasí lia to enter from the back door in the exclusive 
club of space powers. As part of the development of aeros-
pace capabilities, the Brazilian Air Force (Força Aérea Bra-
sileira) has build in the General Command of Aerospace 
Technology, current Department of Aerospace Science and 
Technology (DCTA), the greatest pulsed hypersonic wind 
tunnel in Latin America, known as ‘T3’ (PASSARO; DER-
MEVAL; MIGLIANO, 2009).
Th e Chineses are far away from Russians, and they 
are planning to put in space a space station in 2020 and 
programming expeditions to the Moon and Mars.
Beijing has signed governmental space coopera-
tion agreements with Brazil (CHINA NATIONAL SPACE 
ADMINISTRATIO, 2009), India and Russia, among the 
other countries, and “Signifi cant achievements have been 
scored in the bilateral and multilateral and technology 
exchanges and cooperation”33, as reported by the China 
National Space Administration (CNSA). 
Despite agreements with countries that oppose 
U.S. policies in many fi elds, Brazil does not renounce 
cooperation with Washington, including the training of 
its astronauts at NASA (NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, 1997). Moreover, 
between the Brazilian Institute of Advanced Studies of 
Aerospace Technology General Command (IEAv-CTA) 
and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory is an ongoing 
joint research project (International Beamed Propulsion 
Research Collaboration) to develop a propulsion system 
for laser space rockets and aircraft , which will make the 
fi rst launches between 2020 and 2015 (BRAZILIAN AIR 
FORCE, 2011). Project objective is to develop technolo-
gy of hypersonic aspirate propulsion vehicle, build by the 
international Brazilian-American-Australian consortium 
Screamspace, with laser propulsion capable of satelizar 
nanosatellites (MINUCCI, 2010). Th e idea of using laser 
33 CHINA NATIONAL SPACE ADMINISTRATION (CNSA). 
Organization and Function [online]. Beijing: China National 
Space Administration (CNSA). Available at: <http://www.
cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771918/index.html>. Ac-
cessed: 27 feb. 2015.
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in space operations emerged in the United States in 1983, 
during the Cold War. when President Ronald Reagan 
launched the Strategy Defense Initiative, known as ‘Star 
Wars Program’.
China is also developing capacity for attacking 
satellites and for cyberwarfare, and continues to be held 
responsible for a string of cyber-attacks on a number of 
public and private institutions, even if the Chinese gov-
ernment denies any involvement in cyber-spying cam-
paigns (FRITZ, 2008). It has been as well claimed that 
Russian security services organized a number of cyberat-
tacks as a part of their cyber-warfare against other coun-
tries, even if there is no evidence of offi  cial Russian gov-
ernment or military involvement.
Os space side, India gains major successes of Chi-
na. Th e Indian Space Program began in 1962, and in 1969 
New Delhi created the Indian Space Research Organi-
zation (ISRO) within the Department of Atomic Ener-
gy (INDIAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, 
2014). Aft er having put a spacecraft  into orbit around 
Mars in September 2014, India became the fi rst Asian 
country to reach the red planet. Before India, only the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe had entered 
Mars orbit: India is member of a club that is more exclu-
sive than the nuclear one. It is also among a limited group 
of countries that provide commercial satellite launch ser-
vices. While in 2003 China became the third country to 
send humans into space, India takes giant steps to send a 
man into space.
Technical cooperation among IBSA countries is 
moving forward: in April 2010 South Africa, Brazil and 
India announced a joint programme to develope satellites 
(IBSA HEADS OF STATE, 2010). New Delhi’s govern-
ment considers the India-Brazil a “strategic partnership” 
(MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 2010-2011). 
Th e IBSA Trilateral Dialogue Forum, a coordinating 
mechanism amongst three emerging countries, has been 
established by the Brasí lia Declaration of 6 June 2003, 
which mentions India, Brazil and South Africa’s condi-
tion as “developing nations and their capacity of acting on 
a global scale as the main reasons for the three countries 
to come together, as well as their status as middle pow-
ers”34. Th e Dialogue Forum is boosting the economies of 
34 IBSA TRILATERAL. About IBSA Background [online]. 
IBSA Trilateral, 2015. Available at: <http://www.ibsa-trilat-
eral.org/about-ibsa/background>. Accessed: 28 feb. 2015.
its member countries, as trade between IBSA partners 
has increased signifi cantly since the Forum’s inception 
and indications are that the target of 25 USD billion by 
2015 will be achieved35. On 1 February 2004 IBSA estab-
lished a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Defence (IBSA 
TRILATERAL, 2015), as none of member nations is part-
ner of NATO. 
For its part, Brazil is bringing to the other BRICS 
members the regional cartel of oil-producing countries, 
united by UNASUR energy program, which aims to “pro-
mote cooperation between national oil companies of the 
member states” (HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERN-
MENT OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
OF NATIONS, 2007) at every level, through the Energy 
Council of South America (Consejo de Energético Sura-
mérica), composed of the Ministers of Energy, who, ac-
cording to the Energy Treaty of South America, have the 
task of drawing the guidelinees of the South American 
Energy Strategy36 and of the Action Plan for regional en-
ergy integration, which were discussed in the Th ird Meet-
ing of South American Energy Council (THIRD SOUTH 
AMERICAN ENERGY COUNCIL, 2012).
Th e member countries of UNASUR prefer to keep a 
distance from the U.S. and closer to emerging countries like 
India, China, and the Arab countries, to establish a multi-
lateral program in international relations (UNASUR, 2011).
 6 The Race for a New Global Governance
To certify its position as an emerging power, Bra-
zil wishes to make its entry into the exclusive club of great 
powers: the UN Security Council (UNSC). Th e reform 
of the Security Council requires the agreement of at least 
two-thirds of UN member states and that of all the perma-
nent members of the UNSC, enjoying the veto right. Chi-
na, who is a permanent member of the Security Council, 
endorsed the aspirations of Brazil and India to play big-
ger roles, while Moscow and Beijing support India’s can-
didature, according to the 13rd Russia, India, China (RIC) 
foreign ministers meeting held in Beijing on 2 February 
35 IBSA TRILATERAL, About IBSA background.
36 UNASUR. South American Energy Strategy [pdf]. Quito: 












































2015(FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE RUSSIANS FED-
ERATION, THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 2015). While endorsing 
India’s aspiration of greateness, China just “attaches great 
importance to the role of Brazil in international aff airs, un-
derstands and supports its aspiration of playing a bigger 
part in the UN” (CHUNYING, 2015).
In the past, Brazil has failed to reach this goal, as 
Western states dominate international political and secu-
rity institutions, and “Global political and security issues 
are eff ectively settled by a directorate” with “the exclusion 
of lesser and largely non-Western countries” (HUN-
TINGTON, 1996, p. 39). 
In an attempt to get a permanent seat on the 
Council of the League of Nations “Brazil risked all of its 
diplomatic history by vetoing the admission of Germa-
ny, thereby isolating itself totally from the international 
scenario” (RODRIGUES; MIALHE, 2013). Th e Council 
initially had fi ve permanent seats and four non-perma-
nent, and one of the permanent seats was vacant due to 
the absence of the United States. Th e Covenant of the 
League of Nations expressly provided for the possibility 
of increasing the number of members of the Board. Th e 
Brazilian representative claimed universal League and 
strengthened its position by stating that Brazil continued 
in the role of defender of the Latin American countries. 
Aft er the veto on Germany, Brazil remained in complete 
isolation and, whereas the next Assembly would change 
the rules for the selection of temporary members of the 
Council of the League, the loss of the place that Brazil 
was was given as fact, and the country withdrew from the 
organization on the 10 July 1926. It was a losing hazard.
IBSA members support their claims each other, 
and agreed on the urgent need for reforms in the United 
Nations, especially the Security Council. As Huntington 
wrote “states belonging to one civilization that become 
involved in war with people from a diff erent civilization 
naturally try to rally support from other members of their 
own civilization” (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 35). IBSA 
nations emphasised the need for urgent reform of the 
UN Security Council including expansion of permanent 
and non-permanent categories of its membership, with 
increased participation of developing countries in both 
categories (IBSA TRILATERAL, 2015), as the current 
composition of the UNSC does not “refl ect contempo-
rary geopolitical realities” (IBSA TRILATERAL, 2015). 
Th is position was reiterated at every IBSA meeting, where 
member states have recalled their fi rm commitment to 
multilateralism.
In support of its claims to play a leading role in the 
emerging new world order, Brazil can count on the sup-
port of BRICS and IBSA members, who mutually support 
each other, as well as G-4 members, including, in addi-
tion to Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, against whom 
there is the veto of China for a possible entry into the UN 
Security Council, in view of the political and historical is-
sues between the two countries. Brazil is the only German 
strategic partner in Latin America.
Brazil cannot count on the support of all the UNA-
SUR members, as the greatest impediments to its candi-
dacy as permanent member of the UN Security Council 
are the regional oppositions of Argentina and Mexico 
(SWART, 2009), who is an observer state of the Union of 
South American Nations, as well as observer of the Ca-
ribbean Community (CARICOM) and Mercosur. Buenos 
Aires, which doubled its military spending between 2004 
and 2013 up to 4511 USD (155 percent growth, equalling 
7 per cent of GDP) ((PERLO-FREEMAN; SOLMIRA-
NO, 2014, p. 6), is also a member of Mercosur, and an 
associate member of Th e Andean Community.
In March 2007 Brazil and Mexico - infl uential 
country in the WTO, in line with Washington’s position 
because of the NAFTA agreement signed in 1992 - es-
tablished a binational commission to deepen trade rela-
tions and cooperation in international issues of regional 
agenda (MRE, 2007), whereupon the committee has not 
met since 2008 to autumn 2013, when a meeting was con-
vened to assess the possible collaboration between the re-
spective state oil companies Petrobras and Pemex.
 7 The African Winning and Losing Carambole 
Game
Th e game to support the Brazilian candidature for 
a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United 
Nations, also goes by the African arena, where China is 
playing a gradually increasing role, and where the Afri-
can Union (AU) supports New Delhi’s candidacy (“Africa 
takes note of India’s position and its aspirations to be-
come a permanent member with full rights in an expand-
ed UN Security Council”) (HEADS OF STATE AND 
GOVERNMENT AND HEADS OF DELEGATION OF 
AFRICA, 2008), making of India the only country with 
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support vote of every member of United Nations except 
Pakistan (SWART, 2009). South Africa demands per-
manent African seats in UNSC, too, and is a member of 
BRICS and IBSA as well.
 Brazil, who is a non-Africa state accredited to 
the AU, is involved in the Continent-to-Continent part-
nership through the Africa-South America Summit 
(ASA)37. Other accredited nations, such as Argentina and 
Mexico, are against the entry of Brazil in the UN Security 
Council, while others countrires are competitors38.
To show himself ready to assume a leading role 
in global governance, Brazil expanded his ties to the 
Southern Hemisphere and to the Western Hemisphere, 
playing a central role in crisis management, humanitar-
ian aid and disaster relief in Haiti, Mozambique, Angola 
and East Timor. Actually, the Brazilian military are de-
ployed in Lebanon (UNIFIL MTF), Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
Western Sahara (MINURSO), Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUSCO), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), South 
Sudan (UNMISS) (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). Th rough 
‘peace diplomacy’ Brazil is ridefi ning its strategic focus to 
encompass the South Atlantic. Th is global commitment 
makes Brazil one of the twenty top contributors to United 
Nations peacekeeping missions, with a total of 33 parteci-
pations. Brazil is also the tenth largest contributor to the 
United Nations regular budget, with a net contribution of 
38 USD million for the 2012 Assessment (UNITED NA-
TIONS SECRETARIAT, 2011).
As a member of the Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Lingua 
Portuguesa), Brazil, thanks to the ‘cultural diplomacy’, 
extends its infl uence to the former Portuguese colonies 
in Africa, the continent which sees the awkward pres-
ence of China. In 2013 Chinese Deputy President Temer 
attended the opening ceremony of the 10th anniversary 
of the Forum on Trade and Economic Cooperation Be-
tween China and Portuguese-speaking Countries and its 
fourth Ministerial Conference in Macao, which was the 
37 AFRICAN UNION.  e Africa-South America Summit 
(ASA) [online]. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: 
<http://au.int/en/partnerships/africa_southamerica>. Ac-
cessed: 1 mar. 2015.
38 AFRICAN UNION. Non-Africa States & Regional Integra-
tion & International Organizations Accredited to the AU 
[online]. Addis Ababa: African Union. Available at: <http://
au.int/en/partnerships/others>. Accessed: 1 mar.  2015.
last Portuguese overseas territory to be decolonized, and 
returned to China in 1999.
Th e cooperation with Brazil and other Portu-
guese-speaking nations, a 267 million people community, 
located across the globe but having cultural similarities 
and a shared history, through joint-collaborations in the 
framework of CPLP, include military cooperation, fi nan-
cial aid, and cultural exchange. Th rough successive en-
largements, the Union has grown from the seven founding 
states - Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mo-
zambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe - to the 
current nine, with the self-determination of Timor-Leste 
in 2002 and the accession of Equatorial Guinea in 2014. 
Brazil is also strongly committed in the development and 
restoration of peace in East Timor, where it has a very 
powerful infl uence (the little state-island has its own only 
South American diplomatic mission in Brasí lia).
Mauritius, Senegal, Georgia, Japan, Namibia and 
Turkey has been admitted to CPLP with the status of As-
sociate Observers (COMMUNITY OF PORTUGUESE 
SPEAKING COUNTRIES, 2015). Japan, who claims a 
seat in the UNSC, and supports Western initiatives with-
in the WTO, has had historical contacts with the Portu-
guese language in the 16th and 17th century, and today has 
connections to the Lusophone world through Japanese 
Brazilians in Brazil and Japan.
Th e infl uence of Brazil in Africa also passes 
through the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), which encompasses 14 countries of the South 
of Africa, including two members of the CPLP (Angola 
and Mozambique), and South Africa (SOUTHERN AF-
RICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, 2012), a stra-
tegic ally in BRICS and IBSA.
Angola, along with São Tomé and Príncipe, is also 
a member of the Economic Community of Central Afri-
can States (ECCAS) (ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF 
CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES, 2014), while Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau are among the 15 members of the Econom-
ic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among 
them the infl uential Nigeria, which guests the headquarters 
of the organization. Brazil is among ECOWAS partners, 
along with other strategic allies: Germany (G-4), China 
(BRICS) and India (G-4, BRICS and IBSA) (ECONOM-
IC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, 2015), 
the latter in the lead for a seat in a reformed UN Security 
Council. France, United States and Venezuela complete the 








































Besides its involvement in peace and security on 
Africa, Brazil is extending his infl uence in the continent 
through the bilateral relations, as the Nigeria-Brazil bilat-
eral commission established in 2013. Nigeria is a member 
of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), the 12 oil-exporting developing nations which 
counts among its members two South American allies of 
Brazil (Ecuador and Venezuela, a partner of ECOWAS, 
as well) and a member state of the CPLP (Angola) (OR-
GANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING 
COUNTRIES, 2015).
Th e action of Brasí lia in Africa, where India’s infl u-
ence is strongest, also for reasons of geography, as well as 
political and economic, goes through a kind of ‘strategy of 
billiards’, establishing a series of direct relations involving 
indirectly other countries, playing a ‘carambole game’.
 8 The Competition on Global Events
Th e policy of Brazil, to establish itself as a world 
power, also aff ects the ability of being able to obtain 
commitment for organizing global events. Events like 
the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup, or the Expo, 
demonstrate not only the ability to build political rela-
tionships on a global scale, and the success of the foreign 
policy of the country, but also the possibility of having a 
worldwide showcase for show off  its economic successes.
Th e competition between ‘emerging middle pow-
ers’ is also held on the sporting side: Brazil hosted the 2013 
FIFA Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and 
will host the XXXI Summer Olympic Games in 2016. Th e 
commitment of Brasí lia for the organization of these world 
sports events has caused some controversy, because of the 
high costs borne by public fi nances, even if the indicator of 
population living below the national poverty line decreased 
from 21 percent in 2005 to 8.9 percent in 2013 (GLOBAL 
POVERTY WORKING GROUP, 2015).
 Th e allocation process of the FIFA World Cup 
2014, which is performed by the FIFA’s Executive Commit-
tee, for the policy of rotation, however, was to take place in 
South America. Brazil, which had already hosted the World 
Cup football in 1950, enjoyed the support of CONMEBOL 
(the South American Football Confederation), with 10 
member football associations, and was the only candidate 
to host the event (FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE 
FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, 2007). Th e Brazilian World 
Cup 2014 has been the fi rst to be held in South America 
since the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina.
 Th e importance of these events has been high-
lighted by the IBSA members, which “recognized that 
hosting these events refl ects the positive momentum of 
developing countries” as “they are potentially a tool for 
their social and economic development” (IBSA HEADS 
OF STATE/GOVERNMENT, 2015, p. 10). Th e alliance 
has allowed to other partners to achieve their goals: FIFA 
2010 World Cup in South Africa and 2010 Common-
wealth Games in New Delhi.
In addition to these events, in 2011 the city of São 
Paulo was a candidate to host the Expo 2020, but the Bu-
reau International des Expositions (BIE), the intergov-
ernmental organization in charge of overseeing and regu-
lating World Expos, chose Dubai (UAE). If we analyze the 
result of the vote, we note that the fi rst round United Arab 
Emirates got 77 ballots, Russa got 39, and Turkey took 
33 votes, while Brazil got only 13 preferences, and was 
excluded from the second and from the third and last vot-
ing (BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DES EXPOSITIONS, 
2013): this means that Brazil does not have the full sup-
port of many developing countries, which is credited.
Th e fact that Russia was a competitor of Bra-
zil, and the latter has collected only a third of the votes 
in Moscow, confi rms that the South American country 
gains in international prestige only when supported un-
conditionally by all the other nations with which it has 
strategic alliances (Russia is a strategic partner of Bra-
zil in the BRICS group). In fact, in the allocation of the 
Th irty-fi rst Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro was awarded 
the organization of the event only at the last vote. While 
Madrid on the fi rst ballot had passed Rio 28-26, with To-
kyo third at 22, and Chicago at 18, on the second ballot 
Rio jumped to fi rst place with 46 preferences, followed 
by Madrid at 29, and the Asian city at last place with 20 
votes (INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 
2010). Th e cariocas earned the votes of the countries that 
supported the United States, which have signifi cant eco-
nomic interests in Brazil. Th e last vote, Rio got the better, 
dubbing the Spanish capital 66-32, thanks to the conver-
gence of the nations that supported Japan, strategic ally of 
Brazil in the G-4.
 Sport is a great promotional vehicle for the im-
age of the country, and Brazil, in addition to football and 
other minor sports, boasts a remarkable tradition of For-
mula 1 drivers (31), among which stand out for popu-
larity the three-time world champions Nelson Piquet and 
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Ayrton Senna, the two-time world champion Emerson 
Fittipaldi, Rubens Barrichello, and Felipe Massa.
 
 9 Conclusions
Brazilian foreign policy is characterized by multi-
lateralism, and by the establishment and the membership 
in many international organizations and coordination 
mechanisms. Where there is no direct, Brasí lia extends 
its relations with a ‘winning and losing carambole game’. 
Brazil has formed an alliance with all countries that sup-
port the need for reform of global governance, starting 
with the UN and its Security Council, including WTO, 
FMI and World Bank, leading the protest of developing 
countries against the Western conservatism of interna-
tional institutions.
 Brazil has implemented a regional strategy, as 
well as a global one, to earn a place among the most infl u-
ential nations in the world: an exclusive club, which not 
only takes into account the economic wealth and popu-
lation of the country, but also military power - especially 
nuclear deterrence power -, space power, and other vari-
ables as technological power.
 While the leadership in Latin America is out 
of the question, without prejudice to the position of 
Argentina and Mexico, the global one is threatened by 
India, which has a much more dense network of rela-
tionships, and counts on the support of all the nations, 
excluding Pakistan. New Delhi has an undisputed supe-
riority in military, technology - including the space pro-
gram - and is a member of the exclusive club of nuclear 
powers.
 Despite its multilateral economic relations, 
the Brazilian economy is overly dependent on exports 
to the United States, European Union, China, and In-
dia, in order to overcome the latter in the race for a 
permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, 
which certifies the achievement of ‘superpower’ status. 
In an effort to carve out a leading role in the emerging 
new world order, Brazil exerts its soft power to ensure 
international security: from humanitarian aid to assis-
tance in state and nation building. In the background 
is the specter of failure in 1926, when Brazil was played 
around for a seat in the Council of the League of Na-
tions, and ended up being forced to leave the organiza-
tion. This time the Brazilian multilateral strategy must 
be a ‘winning hazard’.
 Th e strategy of Brasí lia to come out of the ‘always 
emerging’ powers, involves huge costs, because of the am-
bitious military and space programs. Th e current econom-
ic situation, which, aft er many years of growth, marked a 
setback, along with the enormous social inequalities an-
chors in the country, advise against continuing along this 
path. Brazilian policymakers, however, do not seem willing 
to give up dreams of grandeur, too long chased.
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